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THE BASIS OF LABOR EXEMPTIONS FROM THE
ANTITRUST ACTS
IN the field of economic legislation a conflict of policy appears between the
antitrust acts " and the exemptions from them provided for labor unions by
the Clayton 2 and Norris-LaGuardia Acts., The general purpose of the anti-
trust acts, whatever disagreement there may be upon the details of their
application, is to secure for the nation the advantages of a freely competitive
economy, with commodity prices regulated by the market. 4 The policy of
the exempting acts, on the other hand, is to stimulate the growth of trade
unions so as to equalize bargaining power between individual workers and
more powerful employers by permitting labor unions to obtain, if they can,
a monopoly of labor in any given field. The Norris-LaGuardia Act states
the Congressional policy thus:
"Whereas under prevailing economic conditions . . . the indi-
vidual unorganized worker is commonly helpless to exercise actual
liberty of contract . . ., wherefore . . . it is necessary that he
have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation
of representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and
conditions of his employment. . . ." 5
This policy, although contrary to the general aim of free competition, is not
irreconcilable with it; for just as the existence of natural monopolies c does
not decrease the desirability of competitive conditions in general, so the
undesirability of competitive condition in the labor markets 7 does not
-vitiate the purpose of antitrust acts. In practice, however, it becomes nec-
essary to inquire whether it matters what these exceptional monopoly powers
of labor unions are used for, and, if it does, whether they may be used to
prevent interstate shipment of goods, to raise prices,-or to satisfy a private
grudge.
1. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U.S. C. §§ I c scq., §§ 12 a seg. (1940).
2. 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. §52 (1940), 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. §17'
<1940).
3. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 101 (1940).
4. For a general discussion of the purposes of the antitrust lavs sEe Ho oss, ANTn-
-TRUST ACT A.ND THE SUPREME COURT (1941) 4; HAMILTON AND TnIL, T.N.E.C. REp.,
ANTITRUST IN ACTION, Monograph 16 (1941) 5; CLtRn, Tar FEDERAL TRuST POLICY (1931)
,cc. 3, 5; THORNTON, COMBINATIONS IN RESTR.UNT OF TRADE (1928) cc. 1, 2; WL,%n,
HISTORY OF THE SHEatAN LAW (1910) 13; SPELLING, TRUsTsIND MONOPOLIES (1893) c. 13.
5. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. § 102 (1940).
6. For an account of the extent to which such natural monopolies as railroads may be
.subject to prosecution under the antitrust acts see HANDLER, TNEC REIp., A SrtDY 0- To E
4CONSTRUCTION AN ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAvW's, Monograph 3S
(1941) 57-9.
7. Arguments regarding the propriety of labor market monopolies tend to point, on
,one side, to the waste and injustice caused by union practices which tend to reduce employ-
ment and delay technological advance, and on the other to the more or less monopolistic
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The statutes, like their underlying policies, contain some contradiction,
at least on their face. Section 6 of the Clayton Act 8 purports only to exempt
unions lawfully carrying out their legitimate objectives, while Section 20
can be interpreted to legalize, regardless of purpose, most of the usual tacti-
cal weapons of unions.9 It is not surprising, therefore, that the Supreme
position of many employers, even where their product market is competitive, and to the
hardship caused by a rapid technological change. See Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust
Acts (1940) 34 ILL. L. REv. 769. Some economists doubt the desirability of labor monopolies
by trade unions, and their compatibility with a free system in other respects. See SImoNs,
A PosIivE PROGRAM FOR LAISSEz-FAIRE (1934). Certainly they reduce employment by
volume where they are effective in raising wages. See Prwou, PRINCIPALS AND METuODS or
INDUSTRIAL PEACE (1905) app. B; Dunlop and Higgins, "Bargaining Powcr" and Market
Structures (1942) 50 J. POL. EcoN. 1, 19, fig. 3.
8. Section 6 reads: "That the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the exist-
ence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the
purposes of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid
or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legiti-
mate object thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or con-
strued to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust
laws." 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 17 (1940).
9. Section 20 of the Clayton Act reads as follows: "That no restraining order or in-
junction shall be granted by any court of the United States, or a judge or the judges thereof,
in any case between an employer and employees, or between employers and employees, or
between employees, or between persons employed and persons seeking employment, involv-
ing, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment, unless nec-
essary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or to a property right, of the party making
the application, for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law, and such property or
property right must be described with particularity in the application, which must be in
writing and sworn to by the applicant or by his agent or attorney.
"And no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether
singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to per-
form any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful
means so to do; or from attending at any place where any such person or persons may law-
fully be, for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or from
peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working; or from ceasing to
patronize or to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or per-
suading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to, or with-
holding from, any person engaged in such dispute, any strike benefits or other moneys or
things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for lawful purposes;
or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be done in the absence of such dispute
.by any party thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or
held to be violations of any law of the United States." 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U. S. C. § 52
(1940).
It has been held in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 231 (1941), that this
act must be read with the Norris-LaGuardia Act which further narrowed the circumstances
in which federal chancellors might grant injunctions in labor disputes, so that the activity
therein described could be brought within the phrase "nor shall any of the acts specified in
this paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States." For
an excellent criticism of this process of statutory importation see Steffen, Labor Activities
in Restraint of Trade: TheHutcheson Case (1941) 36 ILL. L. REV. 1, and Mr. Justice Roberts,
dissenting in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 245 (1941).
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Court in construing these statutes 10 has displayed some confusion, and has
suggested in the last five years differing criteria governing labor's exemption
from the acts. In Apex Hosiery Company v. Leader," decided in 1940, the
Court refused to apply the penalties of the Sherman Act to a trade union
engaging in a sit-down strike which was attended by much violence and
caused a considerable stoppage in interstate commerce. The doctrinal motif
of the decision is revealed in the statement that the restraints of trade
caused by the defendant union did not involve any "actual or intended
effect on price or price competition." 12 "The Sherman Act," the Court
continued, "was not enacted to police interstate transportation, or to afford
a remedy for wrongs, which are actionable under state law, and result from
combinations and conspiracies which fall short, both in their purpose and
effect, of any form of market control of a commodity .. ." 13 But this
decision left some doubt as to what the Court would do where an actual or
intended "effect on price," or "market control of a commodity" was re-
vealed.
14
By 1941, however, the question of effect on price appears to have lost its
importance. In United States v. Hutcheson,15 a criminal proceeding in which
it was sought to convict a union leader for picketing and secondary boycott
in connection with a purely "jurisdictional" dispute, the purpose of which
was to exclude another union from a certain type of employment, the Court
did not mention any effect on price but emphasized the labor exemptions
of the Clayton Act to show that the defendant could not be convicted.
"So long as a union," the Court said, "acts in its self-interest and doem not
combine with non-labor groups,1 G the licit and illicit under Section 20 [of
the Clayton Act] are not to be distinguished by any judgment regarding the
wisdom or unwisdom, the rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfish-
ness of the end of which the particular union activities are the means." 17
The meaning of "self-interest of a union" was not made explicit; whether
they might only seek ends which unions are traditionally supposed to seek,
10. For the previous history of the statutes see Steffen, Labor .ldMtics in Rcstrainl of
Trade: The Apex Case (1941) 50 Y.ALE L. J. 787; Frxnrr.!nTER.'ND GrXE.u , Tin L.won
INJuNcTION (1930); Magruder, A Half Century of Legal Influence Upan the Dvc!opn, of
Collectire Bargaining (1937) 50 HkAv. L. Rnv. 1071; Comment (1940) 49 Y,-,u L. J. 518.
11. 310 U. S. 469 (1940).
12. Id. at 504.
13. Id. at 512.
14. There seems little doubt that the effect on price criterion v.as a general one, e-
tending to labor and non-labor organizations alike. In reply to the objection of Hughes,
C. J., that it seemed anomalous to hold employers liable for stoppages in commerce and not
employees, Mr. Justice Stone, who delivered the opinion of the Court, stated: ". . . it cems
obvious that the Sherman Act cannot be said to subject employees to liability which it do:.
not impose on employers or others." Id. at 513, n. 28.
15. 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
16. The prohibition of combination with employers seems to originate in United States
v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549 (1926).
17. 312 U. S. 219, 232 (1941).
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or whether they might seek any ends at all without violating the antitrust
acts could not at the time be certain. Last term in Hunt v. Crumboch 18 it
became apparent that the latter was the intent of the Court.19 The defend-
ant union, the Teamsters of Philadelphia, had a grudge against the Hunt
brothers, who were doing business as an interstate trucking partnership,
because they believed one of them to be guilty of the murder of a union mem-
ber, a crime of which he had been acquitted. By intimidation of the cus-
tomers of the partnership and by refusing to allow their members to work
for it under any conditions or to admit its employees as members, the
teamsters forced Hunt Brothers out of business. The trial court and the
circuit court of appeals found for the union 20 on the authority of the Apex
case because the restraint of trade did not affect price or price competition.
The Supreme Court, however, affirmed on a different ground. Congress,
the Court said, had manifested no intention "to make any kind of refusal to,
accept personal employment a violation of the Anti-trust laws." ' Although
the Apex case was cited as authority for this holding, the Court's statement
that the defendants' activity, if carried on by a business competitor, would
have been a violation of the Sherman Act seems to indicate a final abandon-
ment of "effect on price" as a limiting criterion, for under the Apex doctrine
neither business nor labor organizations could be convicted without actual
or intended effect on price.
22
If the "self-interest" of a union announced in the Hutlcheson case is to be
interpreted to include all possible aims, the qualifying prohibition of "com-
bination with non-labor groups" is open only to the narrowest construction.
From Allen Bradley Company v. Local Union No. 3,23 decided the same day
as the Hunt case, it appears that proof of an actual conspiracy between two
or more employers and a union is necessary to bring union activity within
18. 65 Sup. Ct. 1545 (U. S. 1945). ,
19. But this interpretation does not coincide with the views of the author of the .lu1the-
son opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who dissented in the Hunt case, stating that the
exempting acts extended only to legitimate dues of trade unions. See note 28 infra.
20. 143 F. (2d) 902, 903 (C.C.A. 3d, 1944); aff'g Hunt v. Brotherhood of Transporta-
tion Workers, Local 107, 47 F. Supp. 571, 573 (E. D. Pa. 1942).
21. 65 Sup. Ct. 1545, 1547 (U. S. 1945).
22. See note 13 supra. Despite the abandonment of the doctrine of the Apex case the
general dictum found in it that the Sherman Act should not be construed to upset the
"proper distribution between state and national governments of police authority and of
remedies private and public for private wrongs" was used to support the decision in the
Hunt case. The court hints that the plaintiffs had mistaken their remedy, and should have
started in a state court, presumably in an action on the case. Such a procedure, however,
would appear to disturb the previously existing balance between state and federal remedial
powers more than a reverse one since such an action could previously have been maintained
under the Sherman Act. Quaere whether the Supreme Court's view is consistent with the
tendency recently displayed to limit state regulation of labor unions. See Hill v. Florida,
65 Sup. Ct. 1373 (U. S. 1945), Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 65 Sup. Ct.
1384 (U. S. 1945); C. I. 0. v. McAdory, 65 Sup. Ct. 1395 (U. S. 1945).
23. 65 Sup. Ct. 1533 (U. S. 1945).
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the scope of the antitrust laws. 24 Here the union, by means of multilateral
contracts with employers in both the manufacturing and installation
branches of the electrical industry in New York City, had obtained for the
three groups a monopolistic position of great power in that area. The Court
held that, if they had achieved the same result by a bare refusal to work
upon goods not made by their members, they would not have been violating
the Sherman Act, and modified the trial judge's injunction accordingly.2
Thus the Supreme Court seems to have decided that all labor activities
should be exempt from the antitrust acts unless a combination or conspiracy
with employers can be proved. In doing so, despite its recent assertion to
the contrary,26 it has rejected the opportunity to achieve a meaningful rec-
onciliation between labor combinations and free enterprise in other fields,
and has, in effect, instructed labor that it may, if it acts alone, create any
monopolies that may appear advantageous to its leaders.-7 While it is true
that the Court might have adopted the more realistic view of the minority
that the statutory exemption for labor unions was "intended only to shield
the legitimate objectives of such organizations," :3 even this criterion would
not avoid the difficulty of evaluating labor aims in terms of economic policy.
24. Mr. Justice Roberts, concurring in the Allen Bradley case, evaluated the Court's
holding thus: "As I understand the opinion of the court, such a programme . .. [the e.'o
clusion from New York City of articles manufactured elsewhere] is wholly vithin the law
provided only that employers do not jointly agree to comply with the union's demands....
The union is at liberty to impose every term and condition as shown by the record in this
case and to enforce those conditions and procure an agreement from each employer to such
conditions by calling strikes, by lockout, and boycott, provided only such employer agrees
for himself alone and not in concert with any other." Id. at 1542-3.
25. Black, J., who delivered the opinion of the Court, states: ".... When 'we turn to
the sweeping commands of the injunction, we find that its terms ... restrained the union,
even though not acting in concert with the manufacturers, from doing the very things that
the Clayton Act specifically permits unions to do. We agree with the folloing statement
of the Circuit Court of Appeals:
"'[The mandate of the injunction] might well have been stated ... as restraining
Local 3 and its officers "from terminating any relation of employment." ' " Id. at 1541.
26. ". . . we have two declared congressional policies which it is our responsibility to
try to reconcile." Id. at 1533.
27. There seems little doubt that unions vill take advantage of this grant of judicial
immunity, indeed they have not waited for it, and the court reports alone bare witnezs to
the scope of their activities in restraint of trade. See, e.g., Lumber Products Ass'n v. United
States, 144 F. (2d) 546 (C. C. A. 9th, 1944); United States v. International LongEhoremen's
Ass'n, S. D. N. Y. No. 106-448, 1940 (dismissed after the decision in the HvIcson case);
Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union, Local 753, 103 F. (2d)
436 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Local 167, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United
States, 291 U. S. 293 (1934); United States v. Brims, 272 U. S. 549 (1926).
28. 65 Sup. Ct. 1549 (U. S. 1945). Professor Shulman in 1940, urging greater exemption
for labor unions under the antitrust acts, stated that restraints by labor are not violations
if the controversy "(a) is between 'employers and employees, or betiwen employec3' and
(b) involves or grows out of a 'dispute concerning terms or conditions of employment.'"
Shulman, Labor and the Anti-Trust Laws (1940) 34 ILL. L. Rnv. 769, 781. This description
would hardly embrace the exemption accorded the union in the Hunt case.
1945]
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Since the Congressional policy in limiting the application of the antitrust
acts is to equalize the bargaining power of worker and employer,29 a proper
solution of the problem requires an examination of the bargaining position
of each group in different situations.30 In the hypothetical case of a purely
competitive economy neither employers nor employees would have any
bargaining advantage, but in any existing economy where the degree of
competition varies between one market and the other it is necessary, in
order to evaluate the effect of bargaining power in the labor market, not
merely to ascertain the relative numbers of buyers (employers) and sellers
(employees) in that field but also to distinguish between various more or less
competitive situations in the market for its product.3 When monopolistic
conditions prevail in a product market restrictions in production will reduce
the demand for labor, because under conditions of less than perfect compe-
tition restriction on production, by increasing price more than cost, is
profitable to the producer. Moreover, such a monopoly frequently gives
the employer monopsony power in the labor market which improves his rela-
tive position. Thus the bargaining power of labor as between itself and its
employers is greatest, as measured by wages, when the supply of labor is
monopolized-as by a powerful trade union-and conditions most nearly
approaching free competition prevail in the product market.' 2 However,
despite their less favorable position relative to employers resulting from
monopoly in the product market, unions frequently find it advantageous to
aid in the creation of such monopolies in return for a share of the resulting
profits.3
29. See note 4 supra.
30. Bargaining power is measured by the ability of each contracting party to influence
the wage paid to labor. The bargaining advantage, positive or negative, will equal the
actual price paid the labor factor less the supply price which would prevail in pure competi-
tion over the demand price which would prevail in the competitive economy, where the
bargaining advantage would be zero. Thus bargaining advantage of labor equals
Dcp
(when Pf equals actual price paid, Scp equals competitive supply price and Dcp equals
competitive demand price). See Dunlop and Higgins, "Bargaining Power" and Market
Strucures (1942) 50 J. POL. EcoN. 1.
31. The demand curve of the entrepreneur will vary according to the degree of compe-
tition prevailing in the product market, and the supply curve of the workers varies according
to the degree in which monopoly prevails in the labor market. For a table in which the bar-
gaining power of labor is arranged in order of magnitude in different situations see Dunlop
and Higgins, supra note 30, at 19.
32. See note 26 supra.
33. The failure to distinguish between situations where unions are getting profits from
a monopoly in the product market and where they must depend on their bargaining power
in the labor market alone probably accounts for contradictory statements as to the relative
benefits to labor of "competitive" and "monopolistic" industries. See, e.g., DAUOlIERTV,
LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY (5th ed. 1941) 305; BLUM, LABOR ECONOMICS
(1925) 375. In the absence of monopoly profits from the product market, a monopolistic
union appears to have an advantage in the labor market when the market in which employers
must sell is competitive.
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If labor exemption is to be reconciled with the antitrust acts, it should
include only activities which tend to improve the bargaining position of
employees -ith relation to their employers. Interferences in the product
market cannot be justified,34 since their effect is not to gain bargaining ad-
vantage with employers but to obtain superiority for both groups over the
consumer-the very situation which the antitrust acts forbid. Thus the
defendants in the Apex case 3 were properly successful, since the only aim
of the union was to improve its position Nith relation to the employers, and
it made no attempt at market control. In the Hulcheson case, despite the
jurisdictional aspects of the dispute, the union's activity w:as intended to
affect only the labor market, and may also be regarded as ithin the scope
of the exempting acts. 7 The activities in the Hunt case, 3 however, cannot
be justified. It is true that they were not aimed at control of the product
market, but neither did they tend to improve the position of the union in its
proper sphere."9 Thus they fall without the purpose of the exempting acts.
The Apex case, in so far as it set up market control as a criterion limiting
labor's exemption from the acts, pointed generally to a realistic approach
to the problem. However, the doctrine of "effect on price" announced in
that case as a test of market control appears erroneous, since it fails to dis-
tinguish between product and factor markets, as price would presumably
be affected both by legitimate labor activities in the labor market, and by
unjustified restraints in the product market.43
34. Only interference of a sort which would be unlawful for non-lator organizatons is
intended. Semi-restrictive activities, such as advertising and afftxing "union.made" labes
to goods would not in any event appear to be in violation of the antitrust lauv.
35. 310 U. S. 469 (1940).
36. 312 U. S. 219 (1941).
37. But see Steffen, Labor Actirities in Restraint of Trade: The Ir .,eson Case (1941)
36 ILL. L. REv. 1. It may be doubted whether, as a matter of social policy, the jurisdictional
strike is a permissible weapon since the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act. It
would seem preferable, however, to deal with such inter-labor difficulties by mans of kgila-
tion other than the Sherman Act. For an account of the nature and e.xtent of juri.lictional
trade disputes see G.LEXSON, R1VAL UNIoNIs Mn THE UmTanE STrs (1940).
38. 65 Sup. Ct. 1545 (U. S. 1945).
39. Legislative mandate for distinguishing between legitimate and other labor activi-
ties is contained in Section 6 of the Clayton Act. See note S supra.
40. Since it has the effect of raising variable costs, a rise in the price of labor-as caus2d
by monopoly in the labor market alone-should be reflected on price immediately. But c.-e
Yoder, The Structure of tMe Demand for Labor (1942) 32 Ans. EcoN. RE v. Suipp. 261. For a
criticism of the Apex price-effect doctrine see Steffen, Labor Acirities in Restraint of Trade.
The Apex Case (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 7M7.
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